The Effects of the Kyoto Protocol on Taiwan by Su, Yi-Yuan William
Sustainable Development Law & Policy
Volume 6
Issue 2 Winter 2006: Climate Law Special Edition Article 12
The Effects of the Kyoto Protocol on Taiwan
Yi-Yuan William Su
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/sdlp
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sustainable Development Law & Policy by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Su, Yi-Yuan William. "The Effects of the Kyoto Protocol on Taiwan." Sustainable Development Law & Policy, Winter 2006, 51-56,
68-69.
51 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Framework Convention on ClimateChange (“UNFCCC” or “Convention”)1 and the KyotoProtocol2 were the first binding international laws to
address global warming and control manmade greenhouse gas
(“GHG”) emissions. The UNFCCC went into effect on March
21, 1994. The Kyoto Protocol, an update to the UNFCCC treaty,
officially became law on February 16, 2005. 
Both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, like many
international agreements, limit participation in negotiations and
ratification to “States.” After the General Assembly of the
United Nations recognized the People’s Republic of China
(“PRC”) as the only representative of China in 1971,3 most
States severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan.4 As it is not
recognized as a “State” pursuant to international treaty defini-
tions, Taiwan faces a tremendous obstacle to participating in
international organizations. For instance, it is typically excluded
from negotiations and discussion in all meetings concerning
multilateral environmental agreements. 
The international laws and regulations of the UNFCCC and
the Kyoto Protocol affect and limit every nation in the world,
especially because the impacts of global warming are massive in
scale and transboundary in nature. Even though Taiwan is
excluded from the Convention, it still needs to plan strategies to
prepare for the impacts of global warming on its people and
society. This article will review the provisions that limit the par-
ticipation of Taiwan in the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol
and will discuss possible means for Taiwan to take part in the
Kyoto mechanisms. Taiwan has the potential to link itself to
international climate strategies in a way that is unique to its par-
ticular situation.
PROHIBITIONS PREVENTING TAIWAN FROM
PARTICIPATING IN THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE
REGIME
Article 20 of the UNFCCC excludes Taiwan from eligibili-
ty as a signatory to the Convention. This provision limits quali-
fied signatories to the Convention to: (1) the State Members of
the UN; (2) specialized agencies of the UN; (3) parties to the
Statute of the International Court of Justice; and (4) regional
economic integration organizations (“REIOs”).3
Taiwan is neither a member of the UN nor a member of the
International Court of Justice. In the UNFCCC, the European
Union group (also called the European Union “bubble”) is the
only example of an REIO signing the agreement. Taiwan,
though, is not a member of an REIO. Furthermore, Taiwan’s
political status bars it from ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, since
Article 24 of the Kyoto Protocol stipulates, “This Protocol shall
be open for signature and subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval by States and regional economic integration organiza-
tions which are Parties to the UNFCCC.”5 Since Taiwan is not a
politically recognized “State” in the UN, it is not permitted to
negotiate for its interests and is even prohibited from participat-
ing as an observer in those meetings. 
LIMITATIONS ON TAIWAN UNDER THE UNFCCC
AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
TAIWAN’S ECONOMY CONTRIBUTES SIGNIFICANTLY TO
GLOBAL EMISSIONS
As a developing country in Asia, Taiwan’s economic
growth relies on international trade and imported fossil fuels,
particularly coal and crude oil, 80 percent of which is imported.
Taiwan’s total carbon dioxide (“CO2”) emissions were
218,488.86 thousand metric tons in 2001,6 and its total GHG
emission levels ranked 22nd in the world and constituted about
one percent of the world’s total emissions.7
Because Taiwan is the fifteenth largest trading economy in
the world,8 and a specific “custom territory” under the World
Trade Organization, 9 UNFCCC members have not yet resolved
whether to define Taiwan as a “developing country” or a “coun-
try in economic transition.” Taiwan is an island with limited
energy resources. Almost 80 percent of the country’s energy
consumption comes from imported fossil fusels. Even still, eco-
nomic growth in Taiwan produced annual CO2 emissions per
capita of 9.83 tons and led to an average growth rate in CO2
emissions of 6.3 percent between 1990 and 2000.10 According
to a report by the Taiwan Environmental Protection
Administration (“TEPA”), if the international community forced
Taiwan to accept the same responsibilities as Annex I countries
under the Kyoto Protocol, Taiwan would have to “reduce [its]
GHGs emissions by 227 percent … in 2010, against [a] 1990
baseline.”11 Based on this calculation, the five year dramatic
GHG reductions might force all coal-firing power plants to
cease operation, thus limiting electricity access across the
island. Many of the major industries might close or move out of
Taiwan, dramatically increasing unemployment. 
Although the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol regulations
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exclude the island from joining the mechanisms and compli-
ance process, the Taiwanese government still unilaterally
announced its status as a “developing country” and its intention
to abide by those international treaties even though such inter-
national law is not binding on Taiwan.12 In contrast, the inter-
national community has not yet determined the obligations of
Taiwan as a non-signatory government voluntarily complying
with the UNFCCC objectives.
Taiwan is a trading economy, and most Taiwanese companies
are engaged as original equipment manufacturers or original
design manufacturers for value-added resellers in developed coun-
tries. Because of Taiwan’s unique economy, the country is put at a
significant disadvantage when it comes to allocating global GHG
emissions. For instance, there is a risk that many developed coun-
tries will decide to reduce their domestic GHG emissions by trans-
ferring their emissions liabilities to developing countries. This
would result in the shifting of all reduction responsibilities to man-
ufacturing countries, such as Taiwan, while the developed coun-
tries concentrate on related services that produce lower GHG
emissions.13 This scenario would cause a disadvantage to the com-
petitiveness of Taiwanese companies, because under the concepts
of controlling cost and maximizing profit, most manufacturers will
move their factories to a place with cheaper labor costs and less
environmental regulation. This same phenomenon, for instance,
led to massive investment by Taiwanese companies in China after
1999. As a result, it is necessary that both the Taiwanese govern-
ment and private sector prepare adoption strategies to reduce the
negative effects of UNFCCC emission reduction allocations on
their development. 
TAIWAN CANNOT MEET REDUCTION LEVELS WITHOUT
PARTICIPATION IN THE UNFCCC
Article 3 of the UNFCCC requires that all Parties shall take
“common but differentiated responsibilities” in protecting the
climate system for current and future generations, and further
requires that the “developed country Parties should take the lead
in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.” 14
The UNFCCC also stipulates that each Party shall take “precau-
tionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of
climate change and mitigate its adverse effect,” despite any “lack
of full scientific certainty.”15 Additionally, all Parties must enact
regulations to “develop, periodically update, [and] publish”16 the
communication of information related to implementation.17
At the same time, the UNFCCC also recognizes that devel-
oping countries have “special circumstances” affecting their abil-
ities to immediately reduce fossil fuel consumption.18 Hence,
developed countries, including the developed countries listed in
Annex II of the UNFCCC, committed to provide “new and addi-
tional financial resources to developing countries” to address their
climate change policies or measures.19 Such financial resources
include the transfer of environmentally sound technologies and
knowledge.20 Developed countries also agreed to use the financial
mechanism defined in Article 11 to provide “full incremental
costs of implementing measures”21 to developing countries to
develop national communication reports and policies.22
Due to its status as a developing country and its unique
political position, Taiwan lacks administrative capacity and eco-
nomic resources, especially those required to develop and
implement domestic and foreign environmental policies.23
According to a model developed at the National Energy
Conference in 1998,24 if Taiwan planned to reduce CO2 emis-
sions by ten tons per capita by the year 2020, the marginal
reduction cost for each ton of CO2, absent emissions trading,
would be $207.25 In comparison, the marginal reduction costs of
the United States, without trading, for the year 2010 would be
$153.26 Even ten years later, the reduction costs for Taiwan
would still be much higher than those of the United States.
However, according to the records of the UN Environment
Programme (“UNEP”), the marginal reduction costs for China
by the year 2020 would only be $32.27 Overall, the model
showed that emissions trading would be an effective and low-
cost mechanism for most countries to achieve their reduction
goals. However, for Taiwan, the model also showed that the
country would have to spend more to reduce its GHG emissions.
According to the model, Taiwan would further require special
assistance from developed countries in order to achieve the
goals of the Kyoto Protocol, especially since UNFCCC mem-
bership limitations prohibit Taiwan from participating in exist-
ing international emissions trading schemes.
Because it is barred from membership in the UNFCCC,
Taiwan’s ability to obtain financial support from developed
countries is limited. For instance, under Article 12(4),28
developing countries can submit to the Secretariat of
Conferences of Parties (“COPs”) requests for financial or
technical assistance from developed countries. However,
since Taiwan is not a member of the UNFCCC, it cannot uti-
lize the Secretariat as a resource for obtaining financial and
technical support. Instead, Taiwan can only procure the nec-
essary technologies, techniques, and equipment through its
own public or private sector. This means that the costs for
Taiwan to achieve GHGs emission reductions would be much
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higher than for other developing countries, thus going against
the UNFCCC’s equity principles.29
LIMITATIONS ON INFORMATION SHARING
Articles 9 and 10 of the UNFCCC provide two subsidiary
bodies for technical and scientific advising and implementation,
composed of climate change experts and government represen-
tatives. These bodies assist COPs in accessing and reviewing the
effective implementation of the Convention for each Party. The
subsidiary bodies also provide scientific knowledge and infor-
mation to the COPs and give advice to members in developing
country on capacity building projects and research strategies.30
The representatives and experts of the subsidiary bodies serve as
connections between the international organizations and indi-
vidual States. The governments in developing countries can then
use this assistance to build their own teams with expertise on
climate change. These team members have the potential to be a
very helpful resource for the public and academics who wish to
collect information on GHG reductions and educate their com-
munities. Team members could increase communication and
create information exchanges. For example, capacity building
projects could be reviewed and advised by foreign experts. Such
communications and idea exchanges would be valuable for
improving administrative capacities and developing national
environmental clauses and policies.31
However, under the limitations of Article 20, the Taiwan
government cannot submit a National Communication Report to
the Secretariat of the COPs. Even if the Secretariat received the
report, it has no obligation to have subsidiary bodies review and
provide advice to Taiwan’s proposal. Furthermore, Taiwan can-
not have its government representatives and experts join the
subsidiary bodies. 
The membership limitation also restricts Taiwan’s access to
information, not only diminishing the abilities of academic
research, but also reducing the chances to educate the people of
Taiwan. Taiwan is the only developing country ignored by cli-
mate change experts in the subsidiary bodies and as such,
experts will never have the opportunity to review Taiwan’s
GHG inventory records or provide advice for capacity building
or research. Although Taiwan will take unilateral action and
adopt volunteer reduction activities, the government has few
chances to improve its administrative capacity through commu-
nication with foreign experts. At the same time, Taiwan also
loses the opportunity to develop national and foreign environ-
mental clauses and policies.
Information transparency is one of the best ways to pro-
mote compliance with international environment policies;32
however, Taiwan is limited in its access to international infor-
mation and research institutions. The prohibition on partici-
pation in international information sharing bodies creates a
vicious cycle preventing the improvement of national envi-
ronmental policies and administrative capacities. When there
is less research conducted in Taiwan, this leads to a weaker
understanding of the rest of the world in Taiwan. The barriers
preventing Taiwan from submitting various data and statistics
to international organizations lead to difficulties in acquiring
reviews and research by UN related projects on, inter alia,
water, toxics, persistent organic pollutants, biodiversity pro-
tection, and coastal zone management. Furthermore, the lack
of information transparency has caused delays in the improve-
ment of Taiwan’s administrative capacity, because the gov-
ernment cannot access advice from international experts to
build capacity. At the same time, without the necessary data,
analyses of Taiwan will not truly reflect the current circum-
stances on the island. This, in turn, will be a disincentive to
continued improvements in the work of academics, as well as
regional economic development. In the future, if COPs decide
to place responsibilities on Taiwan, it will be difficult to
determine the appropriate levels of responsibility, e.g. calcu-
lating targets and baselines, without allowing further investi-
gation and research projects in Taiwan to develop more nec-
essary and accurate data. 
DENIED ACCESS TO UNFCCC FINANCIAL
MECHANISMS
In Article 4.3, developed countries agree to provide “new
and additional financial resources”33 to developing countries to
meet their different commitments under this Convention. The
UNFCCC defines a financial mechanism in Article 11 that pro-
vides financial assistance and technology transfer to be granted
by subsidiary bodies.34 Moreover, there are two institutions
under the COPs: (1) Articles 21(2) and 9 provide for the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”), which
conducts scientific-technical analysis of adaptation and technical
advice for State members to the “Subsidiary Body for Scientific
And Technological Advice;” (2) Articles 11 and Article 21(3)
launched the Global Environment Facility (“GEF”) in 1991 and
assigned the World Bank (the “Bank”), the United Nations
Development Programme (“UNDP”), and UNEP to be its imple-
menting agencies.35 The GEF serves as a trustee for those devel-
oping countries searching for financial support from the COPs
and monitors the operating of the entities. In the Marrakech
Accords, the Annex of Decision 1, Section A also stipulates that
capacity building “shall be served by the GEF as an operating
entity of the financial mechanism”36 to provide grants and con-
cession funds to developing countries. GEF projects focus on
international environmental issues, including climate change,
biodiversity, land degradation, persistent organic pollutants,
depletion of the ozone layer, and international water concerns.37
After funds are granted, the seven executing agencies contribute
to the management and execution of GEF projects.38 However,
only developing country members or countries with transitioning
economies39 that ratified the UNFCCC are eligible to propose
climate change projects, borrow from the Bank, or receive tech-
nical assistance from the UNDP.40 In these projects, the Bank
acts as a trustee and provides grants to cover the difference or
“increment” while developing economies adopt more environ-
mentally friendly options.41
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As neither a member of the Bank nor a UNFCCC Party,
Taiwan is not permitted to propose projects to the COPs or
donate funds to the GEF. The eligibility limitations force Taiwan
to obtain technical information and knowledge by itself and to
adopt costly environmental options without assistance from
developed countries or experts in the Subsidiary Body for
Scientific and Technological Advice. Taiwan does not have
much technology or experience in GHG reductions or in the
improvement of energy efficiency. Without the financial and
technical assistance of developed countries and access to shared
knowledge on similar experiences, the process for reducing
emissions takes longer and is more costly. This not only wastes
money, but also slows the development of domestic environ-
mental policies and strategies. 
For instance, the Bank created and administers the
Prototype Carbon Fund (hereinafter “Fund”) as a trustee to
finance Joint Implementation (“JI”) and Clean Development
Mechanism (“CDM”) projects designed to reduce GHG emis-
sions in developing countries. Contributors or participants can
receive pro rata shares of emission reductions that are verified
and certified pursuant to an agreement with the country hosting
the project.42 One of the objectives of the Fund is “knowledge
dissemination to provide the Parties to the UNFCCC, the private
sector, and other interested parties with an opportunity to ‘learn-
by-doing’ in the development of policies, rules, and business
processes for the achievement of Emission Reductions under
CDM and [JI].”43 Under the membership requirement, though,
neither the public nor private sector of Taiwan may create a
Trust Fund under the Bank or participate in the operation of the
Fund to collect shares from the Bank. Taiwan also loses the
opportunity to learn from the experiences of the Fund and its
participants, including learning related guidelines, modalities,
knowledge, and procedures.44
According to the rules of the Fund, private entities with the
required capital are allowed to participate in the investment.
However, even though private entities might participate in the
Fund, they might not have any incentive to bring their experi-
ences and knowledge back to Taiwan, due to the lack of demand
for similar trading schemes in Taiwan. Thus, a private entity
would probably prefer to use the experiences as internal risk
control, rather than share with others. Without the participation
of the public sector, the objectives of the Fund might never be
realized in Taiwan. Furthermore, since Taiwan is not a member
of the Convention and Protocol, the GHG offset projects would
not generate certified emission reductions (“CERs”). Therefore,
the management team of the Fund might never invest in Taiwan.
Lack of access to these financing mechanisms forces Taiwan to
take costly measures to achieve its reduction obligations. As
such, Taiwan shares the “common” GHG emission reduction
responsibilities but suffers “differentiated” cost of implementa-
tion compared to other developing countries. 
LIMITATIONS ON TRADING EMISSIONS
Article 6.1 of the Kyoto Protocol stipulates that only Annex
I Parties can acquire or transfer emission reduction units
(“ERUs”). Article 3.10 also stipulates that “any emission reduc-
tion units, or any part of an assigned amount, which a Party
acquires from another Party in accordance with the provisions
of Article 6 or of Article 17 shall be added to the assigned
amount for the acquiring Party.”45 Hence, the JI project and the
ERUs can only be proposed or transferred between Annex I
Parties, which excludes Taiwan.46 Similarly, as a public entity,
Taiwan is neither qualified to participate or launch CDM proj-
ects because of the limitations of Articles 6 and 12.47
The CDM is defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol.
The objectives of this mechanism are to help Annex I Parties
achieve compliance with Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol and
assist non-Annex I Parties (i.e. developing countries) in achiev-
ing sustainable development.48 The CDM allows Annex I coun-
tries to invest in GHG reduction projects launched in develop-
ing countries and exchange CERs. The CERs can be used to
“assist in achieving compliance in the first commitment peri-
od.”49 Article 12(9) allows both public and private entities in
industrialized countries to participate in the CDM projects.
Under the CDM criteria announced by the UNDP, “the
project activity must be undertaken in a non-Annex I country
that is a Party to the Kyoto Protocol.”50 Kyoto Parties will not
undertake CDM projects in Taiwan since such projects cannot
be registered with the CDM Executive Board (the “Board”), and
the emission reductions generated would not be recognized by
the Board as CERs, but only as emission reductions (“ERs”).
Thus, ERs generated from projects in Taiwan cannot be traded
in emission markets between the Parties. Even if the ERs were
generated from a project in Taiwan without CDM Executive
Board registration, the price of the ERs might be much lower
than in other markets, because the risk of the ERs would be
higher.51 Fortunately, Article 12.10 also allows private entities
to submit CDM project applications to the Board,52 so it is pos-
sible that Taiwan’s private entities could use their overseas sub-
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sidiaries, located in the Kyoto Protocol member countries, to
participate in CDM projects in non-Annex I countries and
obtain CERs. 
POTENTIAL OPPORTUNITIES TO PARTICIPATE
The opportunities to link Taiwan with the international cli-
mate change regime are limited because of Taiwan’s small mar-
ket and amount of emissions. In the future, the global commu-
nity might succumb to the pressure of the “one China policy”
and force Taiwan to report its GHG inventory to the PRC and
adopt its commitment targets. Taiwan would not accept this sce-
nario, because it means that Taiwan would disproportionately
share responsibility for PRC’s emissions. Hence, Taiwan should
begin pursuing climate change strategies and attempt to link
with other climate regimes.
Although Taiwan has been blocked from participation in
the international climate change regime, it might still face emis-
sions reduction pressures from its trading partners. In anticipa-
tion of this, Taiwan unilaterally announced it would obey the
Protocol. The Taiwan government also tried to adopt possible
measures to help its private sector and people understand the
potential impacts of global warming. On December 11, 2002,
the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China53 passed the
“Environment Basic Act,” Article 21 of which announced,
“Every level of Administrations shall enthusiastically adopt
[CO2] emission reduction measures and formulate related plans
to prevent the greenhouse effect.”54 This Article commits to the
reduction of CO2, but not of other GHGs controlled by the
Kyoto Protocol. In addition, this Act provides neither a baseline
nor commitment target for Taiwan. The TEPA also issued the
“UNFCCC National Communication of the Republic of China
(Taiwan),”55 and introduced GHG inventories in Taiwan even
though TEPA understood the reports could not be sent to the
Secretary of the COPs. However, the document neither states a
reduction target for Taiwan, nor the baseline, nor other commit-
ments.56 In fact, Taiwan needs more assistance from the global
community in order to draw a framework and baselines for its
policymaking. With this assistance, capacity studies and base-
lines might become priorities for the Taiwanese government as
it determines the most cost-efficient measures for its society and
for future policymaking. 
Because Taiwan cannot issue CERs to investors in devel-
oped countries, these investors do not have the opportunity to
gain credits from the GHG reduction activities on the island. As
an alternative, then, Taiwan should have parallel strategies for
domestic policies and pursue linkages with other climate change
regimes. Additionally, the Protocol encourages the participation
of the private sector.57 Although Taiwan’s public sector might be
obstructed by the rules, its private investors might participate in
CDM activities hosted by other Parties and gain CERs from
those projects for foreign registered offices or subsidiaries. 
Taiwan’s public sector also might pursue agreements with
non-Kyoto ratifying countries, such as the United States and
Australia, to improve the GHG offset projects by investing
among themselves. The non-Kyoto ratifying countries might
also design temporary “credits” until the Kyoto Parties recog-
nize them in future negotiations. Thus Taiwanese multinational
companies might be able to open CER transaction accounts in
member states through their registered offices in those jurisdic-
tions. They could use those entities to enroll in CDM projects
hosted in other non-Annex I Parties. This could help the private
sector’s flexibility and reduce operation risks. In its linkage
strategies with other climate change regimes, Taiwan might also
coordinate with small developing countries in South East Asia
and create joint policies for investment in CDM activities. 
Furthermore, there is also a possibility that Taiwan could
participate in emissions trading. Pursuant to Article 17,58 the
Parties listed in Annex B are participants in the emission trading
system that signed the UNFCCC but did not ratify the Kyoto
Protocol,59 such as Australia, the United States, and Monaco.60
Taiwan’s public sector cannot enter into emission trading
between Parties in the first commitment period, from 2008 to
2012. However, non-Kyoto ratifying countries are still encour-
aged to sell their surplus emissions, and they could participate
in other trading systems, especially since Article 17 does not
prohibit non-ratifying countries from buying or collecting ERUs
or CERs from ratified countries. Hence, Taiwan’s public sector
could enroll in a trading system between non-Parties and abide
by the modification of the COPs.61
In addition, Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol does not
exclude the participation of private entities, so Taiwanese private
entities could still practice emissions trading among Parties.
They have the option to enroll in a voluntary agreement like the
Chicago Climate Exchange (“CCX”) or use their subsidiaries in
ratified countries to participate in trading.62 This increases the
possibility that Taiwan could participate in non-Kyoto party
emission trading mechanisms and gain various emission reduc-
tion credits, because the current regulations are vague and prece-
dent has not yet formed in the emissions trading markets. 
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If Taiwan does not receive recognition by the Convention,
it can still pursue several paths. First, Taiwan could create clos-
er linkages with the United States and Australia as they are also
non-Kyoto ratifying countries. Taiwan could further create
more favorable policies to encourage investors from the United
States and Australia to perform GHG emission reduction proj-
ects on the island. Further still, Taiwan could enlarge the scale
of the non-Parties and then wait until the Kyoto Parties decide
to recognize its system. 
Second, the small developing countries in Southeast Asia
might share concerns over the PRC and India, which will attract
most of the industrialized countries’ CDM activities. Since
Taiwan has the same concerns as other small developing coun-
tries, it should pursue bilateral or multilateral negotiations with
similar countries within the international climate regime to cre-
ate an attractive GHG offset market for the Annex I countries’
investment. International coordination of policies and benefits-
sharing might provide synergy for investors and attract greater
investment in the sustainable development of every country in
Southeast Asia. 
Taiwan is not only prevented from enrolling in the emis-
sions system due to its membership issue under the Protocol, but
also because developing countries are not required to have com-
mitments. Developing countries do not have allowances that can
be exchanged in the current commitment period, from 2008 to
2012. On the other hand, if the United States and Australia rati-
fy the Kyoto Protocol, Taiwan might still have a chance to enroll
in each country’s emissions trading systems and trade the
allowances within them. Both the United States and Australia
are important Annex I countries in the global climate change
negotiations, and they also have abilities and seats in the meet-
ings of COPs and Meetings of the Parties (under the Protocol)
to decide whether to ratify the Protocol with their best interests
in mind. If they ratify the Protocol, the allowances or permits
they are currently dealing might be transferred and merged into
the emissions trading systems between Parties by a negotiable
price or terms. 
In order to prevent the severe impact of enforcement in the
foreseeable future, Taiwan should enroll in emissions trading
systems and obtain practical experiences. For instance, Taiwan
could join volunteer emissions trading activities, such as the
CCX63 in the United States. The public sector might be able to
enroll in the national cap-and-trade systems of the United
States or Australia64 and also rely on brokers to “facilitate
trades across the two systems.”65 By developing a close rela-
tionship with the United States and Australia through invest-
ment and trading, Taiwan might be in a better position to enter
the international climate change regime if the Kyoto Parties
decide to recognize U.S. and Australian emission permits and
emissions trading systems.
CONCLUSION
Before the Kyoto Parties determine the future liabilities
and firm regulations governing developing countries and non-
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, it appears that Taiwan has the
freedom to act as it wishes. However, private companies
might urge the Taiwan government to adopt climate change
implementation strategies, because of low management costs
and pressure from their European customers. The Taiwan gov-
ernment might also not want to share responsibilities with the
PRC if the Kyoto parties force Taiwan to become one of the
PRC commitments, especially because of Taiwan’s political
concerns within the international regime and the absence of
Taiwan during the negotiations. In order to prevent an embar-
rassing scenario from happening in the future, the Taiwan
government should take more aggressive measures to adopt
preliminary implementation, with its high financial and tech-
nical abilities. The highest priorities should be the capacity
studies and determining the baseline of Taiwan. Although the
Taiwan government tried to convene “National Energy
Conferences” in 1998 and 2005 and conclude emission reduc-
tion plans, the meetings did not determine a baseline and tar-
gets remain vague. The earlier participation and well-organ-
ized implementation can help the international climate change
regimes adopt Taiwan’s practices and prevent unnecessary
linkages with the PRC system and commitment targets. The
Taiwan government should take more aggressive measures
and policies, but wait until the Kyoto Parties make a conclu-
sion. Early participation and flexible policies are the only
ways for Taiwan to achieve sustainable economic and stable
social development under global competition.
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